Venues to Include God: Courts, Kings, War, and Murder
by R. Gidon Rothstein
Parshat Shofetim
Tzedek in Process as Well as Verdict
The first verse of the parsha, 16;18, tells us the judges we appoint are to judge mishpat tzedek. Onkelos writes din de-keshot, true justice, a reminder of the necessity of truth in justice. The next verse bans bribery because it blinds the eyes of the discerning, vi-salef divrei tzaddikim, upsets the pleas of the just (the translation already makes a point unclear in the verse, the words affected are those of the litigants, somehow unsettled by the bribe).
Onkelos writes pitgamin teritzin, a phrase I found here and in Shemot 23;8, on the same phrase and same context. Why does he change tzadikim from keshot, truth, the word he used for mishpat tzedek, and in many other places, to taritz, well-formulated? Perhaps because this refers to hearing from the litigants. The judges do not yet know the truth, so perverting justice is not yet on the table.
Rather, having taken the bribe, arguments for the other side will not be well stated. He might mean the litigant will know of the bribe and be less able to present well, but I think he might mean something more: having taken the bribe, the judge will hear the claims with a jaundiced ear.
Miscarriages of justice can occur in our evaluation of the evidence, but also during evidence-gathering, where we miss facts, because we hear only what we want to hear. A judge who has taken a bribe will do that, Onkelos has the Torah saying.
The Impossibility of a Specific Mitzvah Demand to Appoint a King
I heard people quote Netziv’s reading of 17;14 long before I ever saw it, and was bothered by what they said he said. “They” said he said there is no obligation to appoint a king, we do it only if we want.
When I finally read it inside, my confidence was restored, because as far as I can tell, he said something more subtle, more plausible, and more interesting.
The verse does speak of appointing a king only after the people ask for one, giving some the sense that if the people never ask, there is no mitzvah. But, as Netziv himself says, it’s well known there is a mitzvah to appoint a king, independent of our wants or choices.
He explains: some societies cannot tolerate a king, others are rudderless without one. Biblical fiat, even in the form of a mitzvat aseh, an actual commandment, cannot turn a society from one to the other, because the workings of society affect life and death, and saving lives pushes aside Torah obligations.
I want to stress I am working hard to summarize exactly, because so many people think he says something else. He says it is impossible to command us to appoint a king, as long as people are unwilling or unable to bear the yoke of a king, especially if societies around them function well with a democracy.
Only when the people realize they want a king can a Sanhedrin appoint one.
A Mitzvah We Must Be Ready For
I think his subtle point gets lost in people’s rush to find a rabbi to tell them they need not contemplate a monarchy. When the Torah requires shaking a lulav on Sukkot, our mental state mostly does not matter. Sure, we may not feel like putting on tefillin on a particular morning, but in neither of those cases will coerced capitulation damage us much.
Not so with forms of government, Netziv is saying; there, if we try to impose it—even if we all kind of think we should—it won’t work until we’re ready. You might think—as many have—he’s really saying we never need to be ready, except he goes on to say it is impossible to think of this mitzvah as voluntary, because then why did the Torah say to appoint this king after we conquer the Land? We’re allowed to have a king before, such as Yehoshu’a, whom Rambam assumed had the status of a king.
“Rather,” he writes, “you must say it is a mitzvah, just not one incumbent on the Sanhedrin until the people say they want one.” It’s why there was no king the whole time the Mishkan was in Shiloh, because the people were not moved to ask for one.
He emphasizes there is a mitzvah, one we can only fulfill when we are ready. A similar phenomenon appears with a mitzvah such as the one to fear God. The Torah cannot command us to fear God at the highest levels, because only very special people are ready for it. We’re supposed to do our best to get ready. Here, too, I understand Netziv to be saying: this is a mitzvah, but one you cannot fulfill until you’re ready. Not need not, or may not, cannot.
Trusting Hashem
At the end of a list of prohibited sources of knowledge of the future (such as witchcraft), 18;13 says tamim tihyeh im Hashem Elokecha, be whole with Hashem your Gd. Ramban sees a summary of what came before: Hashem controls everything, is the only One Who knows the future, and therefore we should seek that future only from Hashem, His prophets, and those who serve Hashem best and most fully.
Even if we hear a prediction, we are to trust that Hashem can change it, should it be the Divine Will (Ramban phrases it that Hashem is meshaneh ma’arachot ha-kochavim, changes the array of the stars; in more modern speech, we would say it means He can change the laws of Nature.) Ramban counts this among the 613 mitzvot, one of the 248 obligations in the Torah.
The ramifications seem clear: whatever people say must be the future is only possibly or plausibly so. Should Hashem decide (a big caveat), any outcome is possible. It’s very hard to make predictions, especially about the future.
How To Trust in the Supernatural While Acting Naturally
For an example of where we act with full recognition of Hashem’s control in the future, the Torah requires us to exempt certain people from the army, including, 20;8, those afraid and soft of heart. [If Hashem didn’t control the future, we’d want the largest army possible, almost no matter what.]
Ramban reports two views in Sotah 44a. R. Yose HaGlili held that once the kohen had reminded the people that Hashem would be there to help them, only those with sins that excluded them from Hashem’s extraordinary help could possibly be afraid. R. Akiva took the verse more literally, anyone who heard the kohen’s promise and was still afraid lacked the faith in Hashem’s salvation to merit it.
Behag understood the end of that verse as a prohibition, a Jew afflicted with such fear must leave the camp, to be sure he doesn’t spread his negativity to others.
With all this emphasis on trust in Hashem, Ramban takes the other side, too. The end of verse nine calls for the army’s officers to appoint sarei tzeva’ot, military commanders. Ramban explains that wars are fought by people, leaving Hashem to “hide” His miracles within that. Hashem changes Nature only when there’s no other way to bring a desired result or to make Hashem’s Name more known, such as the Splitting of the Sea.
Jews must hold two seemingly opposed ideas in mind, Hashem runs their lives, at least militarily, and they must do all they can to succeed naturally.
A challenge of balance, not to trust Hashem to the exclusion of acting fully ourselves, not to misidentify our efforts as the sole cause of our success.
Spotting Providence
Ibn Ezra’s discussion of eglah arufah, the heifer whose neck was broken to atone for the murder of a traveler between cities, 21;7, twice inserts a Divine element. [Side point, independent of Ibn Ezra: a heifer is a cow physically mature enough to give birth that has not yet done so. A parah adumah, the red cow whose ashes we use to remove tum’at met is also a heifer. The Torah uses different words because eglah means a heifer under two years old, where the parah adumah is to be three or four.]
Ibn Ezra wasn’t the first to wonder why the Torah required the closest city to atone for the victim’s death, when we have no reason to think they were at fault. He answers more metaphysically than I usually expect from him, this only happens to a city if they have sinned in a way similar to this.
Two verses later, when the Torah says the ceremony will expunge the fault of the innocent blood, he repeats his idea, innocent people are not killed (in Israel, when we have a Beit HaMikdash and a Sanhedrin functioning fully) if we are acting correctly. He declares this the sod (esoteric secret, not broadcast casually) of sechar averah averah, sechar mitzvah mitzvah, the words of Ben Azzai, Avot 4;2, the “reward” of a sin is further sin, of a mitzvah is a further mitzvah.
For Ibn Ezra, when the Jews and the Land operate at full tilt, Providence figures prominently enough that random murder implicates the entire nearby city. More generally, one good path leads to others, bad paths the reverse, for him a metaphysical truth, not a psychological one.
We must include righteousness and justice in our courts, appoint kings when we are ready to obey them, have to go to war both with the knowledge of Hashem’s aid and of our obligation to do our best, all while remembering Divine Providence’s obvious and less obvious impact on our lives.
Other Comments We Saw on This Parsha:
Ramban, Devarim 16;18, Shofetim
Rashi, Devarim 16;19, Lo takir panim, Ki ha-shochad
Emet Le-Ya’akov, Devarim 17;9, U-va’ta el ha-kohen
Meshech Chochmah, Devarim 17;11, Lo tasur
Rashi, Devarim 17:13, Ve-chol ha-am
Meshech Chochmah, Devarim 17:15, Som tasim
Ramban, Devarim 17;20, Le-vilti rum
R. David Tzvi Hoffmann, Devarim 18;1, Ve-nachalah lo
Onkelos, Devarim 18;7, ve-sheret
Rashi, Devarim 18;13, Tamim tihyeh
Ramban, Devarim 18;15, Navi
Onkelos, Devarim 18;18-9, devarai
Malbim, Devarim 19;6, Pen yirdof
Ramban, Devarim 19;8, Ve-im yarchiv
Rashi, Devarim 19;13, Lo tachos
Meshech Chochmah, Devarim 19;18, Ve-hinei ed sheker
Rashi, Devarim 19;20, Yishme’u ve-yira’u
Onkelos, Devarim 20;1, milchamah
R. Samson Raphael Hirsch, Devarim 20;2, Ve-hayah ke-karovchem
Rashi, Devarim 20;3, Al oyeveichem
Ramban, Devarim 20;4, Ve-ta’am Ki Hashem
Ramban, Devarim 20;10, Ki tikrav
Or HaChayyim, Devarim 20;10, Ki tikrav
Torat Moshe, Devarim 20;10, Ve-kara’ta eileha
Kli Yakar, Devarim 21;1, Ki yimatzei
Ramban, Devarim 20;18, Ve-ta’am asher lo
Sforno, Devarim 21;4, Ve-arefu
HaKetav VeHaKabbalah, Devarim 21;8, Ve-nikaper lahem
Onkelos, Devarim 21;9, te-va’er ha-dam hanaki