Arguing Austritt
by R. Gil Student
As we discussed previously, on July 28, 1876 — 150 years ago — the Prussian parliament (part of the broader German legislative system at the time) passed a law allowing secession (austritt) from a Jewish community without formally renouncing affiliation with Judaism. This was a law that Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch had lobbied heavily for. Once austritt became legal, Rav Hirsch ruled that Orthodox Jews in his city of Frankfurt am Main were religiously obligated to secede from the Reform-dominated Jewish community and join his independent Orthodox community.
Many leading members of the Frankfurt Orthodox community refused to secede and received sanction for their behavior from Rav Yitzchak Dov (Seligmann Baer) Bamberger, the rabbi and rosh yeshiva of Wurzburg. In a painful and lengthy exchange, Rav Hirsch and Rav Bamberger publicly debated this subject in a series of open letters in early 1877 (included in The Collected Writings of Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, vol. 6, pp. 198-317). To be clear, Rav Bamberger did not oppose austritt but also, given the specific circumstances in Frankfurt, did not require it. Once the organized Jewish community allowed the Orthodox members autonomy to run their own religious services and agreed that any dues paid to the community would not go to non-Orthodox religious services, Rav Bamberger felt that was sufficient to permit remaining a member.
I would like to examine here the main arguments Rav Hirsch gave to require secession and Rav Bamberger’s arguments to allow remaining in the broader community. One point I did not see either make is that the Jewish community in Frankfurt was officially non-denominational — neither Reform nor Orthodox. It was dominated by Reform and supported Reform services, but to my mind that does not automatically make it Reform. However, since both distinguished rabbis generally referred to the community as Reform, with a minor reference by Rav Hirsch to a hybrid community (p. 214), I have to assume I am missing some details.
Rav Hirsch made five primary arguments:
1) The Problem of Membership
Rav Hirsch writes that voluntary membership in an organization implies approval of everything the organization does. This is forbidden because it constitutes approval of non-Orthodox religious activities. (p. 202) This is a very strict position that does not match my experience in other areas of life. Does membership in AARP, for example, mean that every member agrees with every decision the organization’s leadership makes? Some people are purists and resign over any disagreement. Most people remain members of an organization if they receive important benefits or agree with most of the organization’s positions. Requiring full agreement seems like a recipe for complete isolation. It would also mean that if the official Orthodox community ever takes a position with which you disagree strongly, you must resign from that community also or implicitly support that position.
2) Validating Reform
Rav Hirsch writes that even after the Reform community’s concessions, membership in the community implies that Reform has full validity as long as it tolerates the existence of Orthodoxy. This is forbidden because it likewise constitutes approval of non-Orthodox religious activities. (pp. 202, 214) Like the previous argument, this claim is based on the implications of an action and depends on general intent and perception. Because most people do not intend by membership to imply validity to every aspect of the organization, and it is not perceived as such by the broad population, it is hard to accept this argument.
Rav Bamberger adds another consideration. What if you explicitly declare that you reject the non-Orthodox religious activities? The clear statement should remove the implication of approval. Indeed, the very terms of the Reform community’s concessions codify the rejection of non-Orthodox religious activities. (p. 248) Rav Hirsch responds that this is insufficient to remove the implication of approval. (p. 300) Perhaps he means that, realistically, the average person on the street will see that Orthodox Jews are members of the Reform community, which means that they accept the different movements. I suspect that there is an element of truth to this. Over time, peaceful coexistence can come to be understood as recognition of the other movement’s religious validity. Although perhaps there are strategies to prevent that from happening without disturbing communal harmony.
3) Distancing From Minus
Rav Hirsch writes that non-Orthodox movements have the status of minus, idolatrous heresy. The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 17a) says that Jews are obligated to distance themselves from minus because it attracts people away from traditional Judaism. Therefore, we must stay away from non-Orthodox movements. (p. 203) Rav Bamberger replies that minus refers specifically to idolatry and not to heretical movements. (p. 246) Rav Hirsch responds that Rambam says that minus applies also to heretical movements. (p. 278) While Rav Hirsch is correct about Rambam’s view, Rav Bamberger seems to follow Rashi’s view that minus refers specifically to idolatry. This boils down to a debate among medieval commentators, with Rav Hirsch following Rambam and Rav Bamberger following Rashi.
Rav Bamberger argues that the Reform community constitutes inadvertent heresy, which some authorities consider less problematic. Additionally, since the Reform community is willing to facilitate Orthodox religious practice, this shows that they have “no wish to deny, vis-a-vis the Orthodox, the strict and sacred binding authority of the Torah.” (p. 237) Rav Bamberger may have been arguing that supporting Orthodox observance proves that Reform rejects only Orthodox practice out of convenience and not due to theology. I find it difficult, however, to justify such a claim and I cannot otherwise understand this argument. Rav Hirsch likewise strongly disagrees with this. (p. 294)
Rav Moshe (Maharam) Schick from Hungary sent a letter to Rav Bamberger, asking him to retract his ruling (Responsa Maharam Schick, Orach Chaim, no. 306). Maharam Schick’s position is stricter than Rav Hirsch’s and, perhaps, more internally consistent. Rav Hirsch writes that we are only obligated to separate ourselves from non-Orthodox movements but not individuals. (pp. 206, 297)
Why should that be? If we are concerned about influence, about behavior and attitudes that negate and often denigrate traditional Jewish beliefs and practices, why is social interaction acceptable? Maharam Schick requires full separation. Presumably, minor interactions are allowed as with any person but generally separation means also on a social level. Just like we would not engage socially with missionaries, according to this view we also may not engage socially with non-Orthodox Jews.
4) Financial Support
Rav Hirsch argues that paying dues to the Reform community supports the non-Orthodox movement, which constitutes the prohibited act of machazik yedei overei aveirah. (p. 209) Even if the dues do not go directly to non-Orthodox religious activities, they go to the overhead and administration that allow the non-Orthodox to continue their religious activities. (p. 301) This seems similar to the question of whether Orthodox Jews may support local federations which use some of that money for overhead and for support of non-Orthodox religious institutions. Rav Moshe Feinstein forbids donating to federations that support non-Orthodox religious institutions unless Orthodox institutions receive more funds than Orthodox Jews donate. In this way, the money Orthodox Jews donate does not contribute in any way to support of non-Orthodox institutions (Iggeros Moshe, Yoreh De’ah, vol. 1 no. 149). This seems to conform with Rav Hirsch’s position.
5) Non-Orthodox Courts
Rav Hirsch also argued that the agreement was insufficient because the Reform community will have a representative on the board of the Orthodox sub-community which will decide financial matters. It is forbidden to bring monetary claims before a non-Orthodox court (Gittin 88b). (p. 211) I find this confusing because the prohibition refers to courts. If the board would adjudicate disputes between parties, then maybe it would qualify for this prohibition. However, if it merely decides how to allocate funds, it seems a stretch to call it a court. In Rav Feinstein’s discussion of federations, he does not raise this concern at all.
Additional Considerations
6) Rav Hirsch writes that the prohibitions discussed above only apply to voluntary membership in the Reform community. If there is no other option, it is permitted. (p. 214) This would resolve problems 1 & 2 above, because if there is no other option then there can be no improper implications of membership. However, it does not resolve problems 3, 4 & 5. Why would those prohibitions not require people to refrain from membership in a Reform community even if no Orthodox community exists?
7) Another issue that Rav Bamberger raises is concern for the large number of Jews on the margins who are traditional but not sufficiently motivated to secede. Full secession would mean abandoning those Jews. (p. 249) Rav Hirsch rejects this argument because the independent Orthodox community would welcome those Jews and encourage them to take part in any religious services they want. (p. 304)
Reading this exchange 150 years later, the practical predictions underlying the halakhic arguments stand out most clearly. Rav Bamberger trusted that explicit disclaimers and negotiated safeguards, i.e. Orthodox control over its own services, dues walled off from non-Orthodox activities and explicit rejection of non-Orthodox Judaism, would prevent any false impression of validation. Rav Hirsch doubted that trust would hold: he worried about the impression left once the dust settled and the disclaimers were forgotten. A century and a half later, with the circumstances on the ground very different, it’s hard to say which of the two scholars’ concerns would still hold today. I suspect, though, that very often Orthodox independence offers greater room for dynamic growth and entrepreneurial spirit.