The Interfering Rabbi
by R. Gil Student
I. Secession and Authority
On July 28, 1876 — 150 years ago — the Prussian parliament (part of the broader German legislative system at the time) passed a law allowing secession from a Jewish community without formally renouncing affiliation with Judaism. This was a law that Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch had lobbied heavily for. Once secession became legal, Rav Hirsch ruled that Orthodox Jews in his city of Frankfurt am Main were religiously obligated to secede from the Reform-dominated Jewish community and join his independent Orthodox community. However, most initially refused to do so. Seceding from the long-standing Jewish community carried large emotional costs, not least of which was losing the opportunity to be buried in the mainstream Jewish community’s cemetery with their ancestors. Among those who refused to secede were some of the most traditionally learned laymen in the community.
Adding to Rav Hirsch’s frustration at the low rate of individuals seceding from the Frankfurt Jewish community, one of the leading Orthodox rabbis in Germany publicly declared that people were not religiously obligated to secede from the Frankfurt Jewish community. Rav Yitzchak Dov (Seligmann Baer) Bamberger served as the rabbi of Wurzburg, rosh yeshiva of the yeshiva in Wurzburg and the founder of the teachers’ seminary there. The yeshiva in Wurzburg had previously trained a generation of German Torah scholars under Rav Avraham Bing. Rav Bamberger revived the yeshiva and served as its leading figure. In contrast to other German Torah institutions at the time, Rav Bamberger insisted that secular education could not detract from the yeshiva’s schedule at all, which was dedicated completely to Torah studies.
Generally speaking, Rav Bamberger approved of seceding from Reform-dominated communities. However, as we shall see later, the specific circumstances in Frankfurt led him to rule that people were not obligated to secede. He even published this in the newspaper. This interference in local Frankfurt halakhah by an outside rabbi greatly frustrated Rav Hirsch. In order to mitigate the damage to his plans for the independent Orthodox community, Rav Hirsch responded with an open letter chastising Rav Bamberger and disputing his conclusions. Rav Bamberger, in turn, replied with an open letter, and then Rav Hirsch responded with a final, lengthy open letter. All three letters are available on volume 6 of Rav Hirsch’s collected writings. They have been discussed at great length by historians (e.g. Dr. Judith Bleich, “The Frankfurt Secession Controversy” in Jewish Action, Winter 1991-1992). I hope to examine the substantive disagreements at a later time and here would like to discuss one specific halakhic disagreement between the two rabbis: did Rav Bamberger have the halakhic right to disagree with Rav Hirsch?
II. After a Rabbi Forbids
Once Rav Hirsch ruled to forbid membership in the Frankfurt Jewish community, was any other rabbi allowed to permit it? The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 7a) says: “One who asks a sage and he rules that it is impure, he may not ask another sage who rules it is pure. One who asks a sage and he rules it is forbidden, he may not ask another sage who rules it is permitted.” As we will see, the facts of this case render this question irrelevant. However, for some reason, both parties engaged in debate over it and I believe it is worthwhile to examine their arguments.
Toward the end of his first open letter, Rav Hirsch invoked this rule (Collected Writings, vol. 6, p. 218). Rav Moshe Isserles quotes the rule in his gloss to Shulchan Arukh (Yoreh De’ah 242:31) and adds that another rabbi may permit a rabbi’s prohibitive ruling only if the initial rabbi made a mistake in basic knowledge (devar Mishnah) or judgment (shikul ha-da’as). Since Rav Bamberger did not even attempt to demonstrate Rav Hirsch’s mistake of either of these kinds, he had no right to contradict the local rabbi’s ruling.
As alluded to above, Rav Bamberger should have responded that the facts of the case make the rule irrelevant, as his son later said (Responsa Zeikher Simcha, no. 230). However, inexplicably, Rav Bamberger instead replied that the rule does not apply in this case due to various technicalities. Rav Shabsai Cohen (17th cen., Poland) quotes two opinions on whether a greater rabbi may permit what a lesser rabbi forbids (Shakh, Yoreh De’ah 242, Kitzur Hanhagos, par. 1). Since this case is a rabbinic matter, we rule leniently and allow a greater rabbi to issue a permission. He writes, “Therefore, a rabbi of generally recognized superior qualifications is not bound to accept the ruling of a rabbi with other qualifications if he is convinced that the ruling of the latter is in error” (Collected Writings, vol. 6, p. 233). Rav Bamberger adds that the Shakh’s language in that passage includes another qualifier: the ruling has to be accepted (chalah) and disseminated (nispashtah). Since Rav Hirsch’s ruling was rejected by the majority of his community, including the most learned segment, it never reached the level of acceptance and dissemination that would prevent another rabbi from disagreeing (ibid., pp. 234-235).
III. A Solid Ruling
From today’s perspective, it is hard to believe that Rav Bamberger, essentially a footnote to rabbinic history, would claim that he was a greater rabbi than Rav Hirsch, who remains a household name in the Jewish community. We have to remember that, at the time, Rav Bamberger was a leading halakhic authority in Germany whose rulings were widely sought and a major rosh yeshiva. Even still, Rav Hirsch took offense at the claim and responded at length to this particular point (15 pages in the English edition, pp. 261-276).
Rav Hirsch makes a few points. First, the Shakh meant that a ruling which meets no opposition from the start may not later be disputed. Once the ruling is issued without objection, it applies (is chal). Second, a real gadol, great scholar, would be too humble to claim to be a gadol. Third, the two opinions regarding whether a greater scholar may permit that which a lesser scholar forbade correspond to the two views of why such a prohibition exists.
According to one understanding, it is disrespectful of a Torah scholar to permit something which he already forbade. According to another, something more complicated is at work. Someone who asks a halakhic question of a rabbi, implicitly vows to follow his ruling (unless he explicitly says to the contrary). Therefore, when a rabbi forbids something, the questioner has accepted on himself that it is forbidden in a vow-like way (shavya chatikhah de-issura). The issue of a greater rabbi, therefore, turns on the rationale behind the prohibition. According to the second understanding, it does not matter whether a greater rabbi subsequently permits the item. The questioner has already rendered it forbidden by submitting himself to the first rabbi’s ruling. But if it is a matter of respect to the first rabbi, then this is not a concern when a greater rabbi issues a contrary ruling because it is not disrespectful for a greater rabbi to disagree.
Rav Hirsch points out that the majority view follows the second understanding. Therefore, a greater rabbi may not disagree. The other view mentioned by the Shakh is disregarded. Additionally, this vow-like self-acceptance of a prohibition applies on a biblical level, as Rav Hirsch says is explained by the Pri Megadim (Yoreh De’ah 1:39).
IV. Evaluation
Looking at this issue from a century and a half later, I see the disagreement painful and perplexing. It is a shame that it took place, particularly in public. And some of the arguments seem forced. Rav Bamberger’s argument that a ruling must be accepted and disseminated seems valid. As his son points out, Rav David Segal (17th cen., Poland) says this explicitly on the similar issue of a rabbi forbidding something that another rabbi has already permitted (Taz, Yoreh De’ah 242:18, quoted in Responsa Zeikher Simcha, no. 230). Rav Tzvi Ashkenazi (17th cen., Netherlands) writes that Rav Segal’s words are “correct in their reasoning and their inference” (Responsa Chakham Tzvi, no. 53). Rav Shlomo Kluger (19th cen., Ukraine) argues that Rav Moshe Isserles would apply this only to a case when an earlier rabbi ruled leniently but the Shakh would apply it even when an earlier rabbi ruled strictly (Responsa Tuv Ta’am Ve-Da’as, third recension, vol. 2, no. 80). It seems that Rav Bamberger had ample support for his claim that Rav Hirsch’s ruling did not reach the level in which another rabbi may not disagree.
Additionally, Rav Hirsch’s statement that this issue is biblical, rather than rabbinic, seems highly debatable. His proof is from a Pri Megadim discussing cases when someone actually says, “this is forbidden.” It is a stretch to apply that to the analogous case of someone implicitly accepting a rabbi’s ruling. Indeed, one contemporary work says explicitly, “Any doubt in this issue, we act leniently, because this is entirely rabbinic and a doubt on a rabbinic matter is decided leniently” (Rav Aharon Aryeh Katz, Pesakim U-Teshuvos, Yoreh De’ah 242:44). Additionally, while it is uncomfortable for one rabbi to claim higher station than another, it is important to know one’s role in the community, both formal and informal. Rav Bamberger was, at least at the time, a more established halakhic authority in the community than Rav Hirsch.
On the other hand, it is unseemly for any rabbi to interfere in another rabbi’s community matters. (I have in the past written on this subject but there is not sufficient space here to explain the differences.) Rav Hirsch worked for years to change the law to allow secession and to build a separate Orthodox community. Rav Bamberger’s interference caused Rav Hirsch significant challenges. Whether technically permissible or not, there is a serious moral failing in this interference. However, the actual course of events makes this entire issue somewhat irrelevant. Rav Bamberger had long been a proponent of secession when necessary, and in Frankfurt specifically.
V. Conclusion
As Rav Bamberger explained in his first public statement on this subject, members of Rav Hirsch’s circles asked him to speak with the leading opponents of secession in Frankfurt in order to change their minds. In the course of the conversation, they explained the latest concessions of the mainstream community that essentially gave the Orthodox community everything they wanted, which changed Rav Bamberger’s mind. He could not, in good faith, tell them that they are obligated to secede. However, a newspaper incorrectly reported that Rav Bamberger had ruled that people are forbidden to secede. In order to counter this misinformation, he was forced to issue a public clarification in the newspaper that his position merely is that there is no obligation to secede. In other words, he had not intentionally issued a ruling on the subject but rather refrained from supporting Rav Hirsch’s position after being invited into the conversation and receiving local insight. In hindsight, Rav Bamberger could have said less publicly, something along the lines of refraining from discussing the matter any further.
To some degree, this reminds me of Rav Moshe Feinstein’s position on the Flatbush eruv. In 1978, the Va’ad HaRabbonim of Flatbush had established a plan to build an eruv based on the lenient ruling of Rav Menashe Klein. They took this plan to Rav Moshe Feinstein who replied that he does not agree but they do not have to follow his opinion. However, word spread that Rav Moshe Feinstein had permitted the eruv so he felt it necessary to say unequivocally that he opposed it (Iggeros Moshe, Orach Chaim, vol. 4, no. 87).
To his credit, Rav Hirsch persevered despite the initial challenges in building his independent Orthodox community. Ultimately, much of the mainstream Orthodox community seceded and his independent Orthodox community famously thrived, with the deep involvement of many of Rav Bamberger’s family members.