Women and Time-Related Commandments
by R. Gidon Rothstein
29 Tevet: R. Uzziel and Tzitz Eliezer on Women and Time-Related Commandments
Two easy ways to describe how halachah differentiates men from women is to speak about women’s exemption from mitzvot ‘aseh she-hazman grama, obligations with a time component, and from the obligation of Talmud Torah, of studying Torah.
There’s much more to it than that, but on the 29th of Tevet—forty-four years apart—R. Uzziel and Tzitz Eliezer took on these two issues in ways that at least partially enlighten us as to how they viewed what’s often called “women’s role in Judaism.”
Uncommanded or Exempt?
R. Uzziel went first, in Shu”t Mishpetei Uzziel 4; Inyanim Kelaliyim 4, dated 29 Tevet 5698 (1938). He was curious about women making a bracha as they are about to perform a time-related obligation (since they are in general allowed to perform such mitzvot). It’s a much-discussed topic [the usual assumption is that Sefardi women do not make a bracha on such observances, while Ashkenazi women do].
R. Uzziel points out that when we say that women are not obligated in these kinds of mitzvot, we might mean the Torah never included them in that obligation. Equally possibly, we could mean that the mitzvah is relevant to them, but that the Torah exempted them. The answer will affect the question of whether they make a blessing; if women were never included, they might not be able to make a blessing that uses the words, “Who sanctified us in His commandments and commanded us.”
Rosh HaShanah 33a cites a debate between R. Yehudah on the one hand and R. Yose and R. Shim’on on the other as to whether women can voluntarily perform mitzvot from which they are exempt. R. Uzziel lines that up with the question he had raised; for R. Yehudah, the Torah never included women in these mitzvot, and they therefore have no reason to perform them [and, if it’s an issue affecting the Temple service, it might not be allowed]. For R. Yose, women were included, just exempted.
Exempt Can Still Make Brachot
We follow the view of R. Yose, which should mean—according to R. Uzziel’s analysis—that women can make brachot on these mitzvot. However, Rambam and Shulchan Aruch, for all that they too accepted R. Yose’s view, still ruled that women cannot make such brachot. Since he just argued the other way, R. Uzziel struggles to explain. He says Rambam and Shulchan Aruch held that one cannot make a bracha on a performance unless obligated in some way, such as Rabbinically. Since women are fully exempt, they cannot make a bracha.
Despite that, he does say that Rabbenu Tam’s view is more logical. He does not go the next step and encourage even Sefardi women to make brachot when they observe such mitzvot, but he’s gone pretty far already, making clear that he thinks the Ashkenazic practice is the more correct one.
Why?
The Gemara does not lay out the reasons for this exemption, and commentators sought to fill the gap. Tosafot Rid attributed it to the fact that women were under the authority of their husbands or Avudraham that women were meshu’abadot to their husbands, were committed to the service of their husbands [in both cases, the point was that their time was not their own, so they couldn’t be obligated in mitzvot that required a certain action at a certain time; I am well aware that these views don’t sit well with many today, but we’re here to learn from R. Uzziel, and he’ll offer another reason in a moment].
Following that view, some later authorities argued that women should then be obligated to keep positive time-connected mitzvotfulfilled by refraining from action. For example, the Torah commands us to be shovet, to “rest” (in the halachic sense) on holidays [while this sounds like a prohibition, the Torah expresses it in the positive, as a mitzvat ‘aseh]. There’s nothing in that that conflicts with a woman serving her husband [whatever that means], so some acharonim held women were included.
R. Uzziel disagrees, because if women are bound over to their husband’s service, everything they do has to be focused on that; he draws the analogy to contract laborers, who even in their off hours cannot act in way that would make them less able to work well for their employers [such as a baseball player deciding to play basketball in his off hours, and getting injured—bonus points for contacting me with the reference! Email is my first initial, the first six letters of my last name, at gmail].
But that very analogy leads him to reject this as the reason for women’s exemption, since laborers, who are in fact beholden to an employer, are not exempted from these mitzvot. Women are at worst more loosely implicated in their husbands’ service than these employees, so how could we argue that that’s why the Torah exempted them?
R. Uzziel’s Suggestion
He is comfortable relying on his logic to reject their reason because there was no tradition that said that —I think he means to say that had the Gemara given that reason, he would have had to tread more lightly and carefully in discarding it. But when there’s a blank space in Torah and someone suggests a way to fill it, even if that person is a rishon, an R. Uzziel felt comfortable being unconvinced.
His own idea—perhaps not that much more palatable to modern readers, but still his view—is that women’s nature and role in life means they are committed to the household and raising of children, such that their time is not their own. [I think we can question that, as I did in a chapter in We’re Missing the Point: for example, by Torah law, shofar blowing involves nine blasts; is a woman raising children really unable to find the time for nine blasts? This is not the place to offer another possibility; interested readers can look it up in We’re Missing the Point: What’s Wrong with the Orthodox Jewish Community and How to Fix It].
So the Torah exempted them, like an osek be-mitzvah, someone involved in another mitzvah.
[I also note that he says women do this because that’s their nature. To me, that’s an interesting question: today, many object to speaking about what is or isn’t women’s nature, but what if there is such a thing as the general nature of women, and that general nature led them to prefer raising children, and the Torah accommodated that by freeing them of these obligations?]
In Conclusion
Based on his anaylsis, he is fine with people following the view of Rabbenu Tam (since he thought that was more correct). In addition, he holds that women should clearly make a brachah on lulav and shofar, since those two mitzvot hint at (or symbolize) an idea that includes them as much as men, that we want to foster a world where Jews are united in their connection to Hashem.
He also says that’s the general custom, which is interesting to me, in that he was a Sephardi rabbi. He seems to be saying that Sephardic women in his time made a brachah on lulav. [R. Hayyim David Halevy, in Aseh Lecha Rav 8;20—from 10 Shevat, which I intend to discuss on my ou.org podcast A Responsum a Day on that day—holds that way as well, that Sephardi women make a brachah on lulav].
A brief reminder of some of the issues with the observance of time-related obligations.
Birchot HaTorah
On 29 Tevet 5742 (1982), Tzitz Eliezer 15;24 took up some of these issues as well, in responding to a suggestion about why women clearly do make a brachah on Torah study when they are exempt from that mitzvah as much as from the ones we’ve been discussing.
I don’t have the space for the full back and forth, but I want to share a couple of points. First, Tzitz Eliezer is writing to a cousin (he calls him ben achot imi, the son of my mother’s sister) named Tzvi Pesach Frank. This is not the more well-known R. Tzvi Pesach Frank, who was the rabbi of Jerusalem for decades, but can you imagine how daunting it is to carry that name through life?
On the substance, the question is why Orach Chayyim 47;14 says that women make a brachah on Torah study. Skipping much of the back-and-forth, Tzitz Eliezer comes to cite the Chida, himself quoting Maharshal, who says that women are obligated to study the mitzvot relevant to them, or Ba”ch, who said that women were shayachot (relevant) to the study of such mitzvot. Chida preferred Ba”ch’s formulation since he knew of no such obligation. Tzitz Eliezer notes that this works only if we hold that women aren’t at all relevant to obligations with a time element (as we discussed in R. Uzziel’s responsum, which Tzitz Eliezer does not reference).
Ownership of Torah
Tzitz Eliezer is unconvinced, especially since he doesn’t see why relevance is an issue [it always catches my attention when a great scholar does not see that which seems obvious to me—the argument would be that one can only bless Hashem for a commandment if that commandment in some way applies to that person. If women are relevant to Torah study, they can thank/praise/bless Hashem for giving it; but if they’re taking on something that’s not at all theirs, what’s the meaning of thebrachah?]
He instead points to an idea stated by the Gri”z (R. Yitzchak Ze’ev Soloveitchik, known to some as R. Velvel or the Brisker Rav) in the name of his father, R. Chaim Soloveitchik. In addition to an obligation to study Torah, the brachot we make recognize and bless Hashem for the Torah itself; while women have no obligation, the recognition of the wonder of the Torah itself (the cheftza of Torah) applies to women as well. [Tzitz Eliezer does not raise the possibility that women should therefore only make some of the birchot ha Torah that we make; he would have to assume that all the brachot are on both the mitzvah and the cheftza of Torah].
There’s more to the discussion, but leaving it there gives us a bit of closure in that it was the point that connects this responsum to that of R. Uzziel’s, the question of what the Torah meant by exempting women, and of what that says about their connection to those mitzvot and Torah in general.