Leo Strauss spent a good deal of time discussing the differences and common ground between religion and secular philosophy, or as he called them, Jerusalem and Athens. Although in his youth he experimented with Orthodox Judaism, for the bulk of his life he was not a religious man. Unsurprisingly for someone who wrote about contradictions in philosophical writings, his own thoughts on religion seem conflicting (see here: link). Be that as it may, below is an excerpt that resonates with me.
After arguing at length, both on substance and assumptions, that neither religion nor purely secular philosophy can disprove each other, Strauss addresses the implications of this realization. His conclusion is that since neither system can be be conclusively proven, the choice of either must be based on faith. Others would revise it to be that the choice of either must be based on non-rational reasons, such as tradition and personal predilections including faith.
Leo Strauss, “Progress or Return?” in An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays by Leo Strauss, pp. 309-310:
If one can say colloquially, the philosophers have never refuted revelation and the theologians have never refuted philosophy, that would sound plausible, considering the enormous difficulty of the problem from any point of view [as previously explained]. And to that extent we may be said to have said something very trivial; but to show that it is not quite trivial, I submit to you this consideration in conclusion. And here when I use the term philosophy, I use it in the common and vague sense of the term where it includes any rational orientation in the world, including science and what have you, common sense [alone]. If this is so, philosophy must admit the possibility of revelation. Now that means that philosophy itself is possibly not the right way of life. It is not necessarily the right way of life, not evidently the right way of life, because this possibility of revelation exists. But what then does the choice of philosophy mean under these conditions? In this case, the choice of philosophy is based on faith. In other words, the quest for evident knowledge rests itself on an unevident premise.