by Joel Rich
Rabbi Sobolofsky: Shev Shmaasa
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos (Sfeika d’Raissa l’chumra)
We all know that sfeika d’uraita (doubt in a Torah prohibition case) l’chumra (we are stringent) but is that a Torah rule or a rabbinic one? The Rambam says the latter. This Shiur gives a deep analyzes of the safeik mamzer case, is it a paradigm or an exception?
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 2 (Sfeika d’Raissa l’chumra – con’t)
Continuation of safeik analysis focusing on orlah outside of Eretz Yisrael. A number of proofs against the Rambam’s position are presented.
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 3 (Sfeika d’Rabbanan)
Safeik Drabannan l’kula (lenient) –Is this a vadaii (definite) decision or just a leniency?
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shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 4 (sfeik sfeika)
Understanding sfek sfeika in a number of applications—is it a rule in safeik d’uraita l’chumra or a subset of the rules of rov (majority)? How does a sfek sfeika stack up against a Chazaka?
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 5 (sfeik sfeika con’t – shame echad)
Continuation of the discussion of sfek sfeika and the positions of the Rambam (based on sfeika duraita l’kula) and Rashba (based on rov [majority]).
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 6 (sfeik sfeika con’t)
How do we understand the difference between sfek sfeika (double doubt) and one big doubt? Shem echad issue may be rooted in rov (or maybe not).
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 7 (sfeik sfeika con’t)
When you have a sfek sfeika do we care if we could actually clarify the doubt (efshar lvarer)? What if it’s hard to do? Easy? Is sfek sfeika based on rov? How do we understand that we don’t follow rov in monetary cases?
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 8 (Introduction to “rove”)
Looking back to rov dita kaman (finite sample space in front of us) vs. delta kaman(generalization)—can we tie this to the two concepts of birur (clarification) vs. hanhaga (practical action) and to mamzeirut vs. maaser bhaima paradigms?
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 9 (Chayshinan Lmiuta, Kavua – minority opinion)
Chayshenan l’miuta (we’re concerned about minority cases). Is this a Torah or rabbinic principle? How does it apply when it’s a miyut hamatzui (material minority)? How do we understand kavua kmechtza (a fixed doubt is always considered 50%)?
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 10 (Bitul b’Rov)
Do we go after rov (majority) because of the general rules of sfeikot (doubt) or is it due to a special rule? R’Chaim explains the concept of rov based on the court principle of 2 out of 3 judges and thus it’s an existential transition of the minority into the majority.
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 11 (Rov: Chozer Une’er – issur comes back)
Rov can be reversed if the minority is “obvious” (nikkar) and the minority can also be chozer v’niur (come back into reality). The “obvious” can be statistical or taste in a kashrut situation.
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 12 (Chazaka as a din Hanhaga)
Does chazakah work based on birur (certainty) or hanhaga (we have to have a way to act)? How do rov and chazakah interact? Does birur always trump hanhaga? How do we relate to various types of chazakah (e.g., current, past)?
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 13 (Chazaka: Limitations)
More on rov vs. chazakah. Do they operate on a Torah or rabbinic level? Does a doubt in factual issues operate in a similar manner to a doubt in halachic jurisprudence?
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 14 (Chazaka: Following Rov in Monetary Cases)
How does safeik (doubt) impact monetary cases? Why does Shmuel hold that we don’t follow the majority in monetary cases? How does possession play into any determinations? Do different types of rov’s (e.g., statistical) get treated differently?
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 15 (Rov and Chazaka by monetary cases)
Chazakah eino poreah (people don’t repay loans early) works by monetary cases because it’s an “overwhelming majority” [only chazal can determine these!?] Is migo (I could have told a better lie, so believe me) based on rov or something else? We only use migo to prevent money transfer but not to force it. The general rule is possession trumps all.
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 16 (Eidim Zomemim, Eidei Hachasha)
The rule of eidim zomimim a chiddush or maybe not? Is migo based on rov or just a unique rule in beit din court system?
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 17 (2 Sets of Witnesses who Contradict)
Is How do rov and chazakah impact a case where we have two pairs of contradictory witnesses? Is the answer different for different types of chazakah?
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 18 (2 Witnesses Who Contradict Testifying Later)
When you have two pairs of contradictory witnesses, are they no longer able to testify? From what point of time and on what basis? It may be that even two witnesses don’t provide 100% certainty.
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 19 (Exceptions Where 1 Witness is Believed)
We see sometimes we don’t need two witnesses to establish truth depending on Chazal’s understanding of the likelihood of the truth being told. The shiur discusses a number of cases where one witness is believed, and why.
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 20: 1 Witness Believed by Isurim
Can a single witness challenge a chazakah? Hilchot nidda as a paradigm for answering this question.
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 21: Woman’s Credibility to Say She is a Niddah
More on hilchot nida, chazaka and why a single witness is believed.
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Shev Shmaysa Sugyos Part 22: One Witness by Issurim – who is included?
Individual nemanut (credibility) as impacted by amalta (supporting reason), chazakah or reason not to believe (e.g., mumar [apostate]).